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Abstract
We study how ownership structure and management objectives interact in deter-
mining the company size without assuming information constraints or explicit costs
of management. In symmetric agent economies, the optimal company size balances
the returns to scale of the production function and the returns to collaboration eﬃ-
ciency. For a general class of payoﬀ functions, we characterize the optimal company
size, andwe compare the optimal company size across diﬀerent managerial objectives.
Wedemonstrate the restrictiveness of common assumptions on eﬀort aggregation (e.g.,
constant elasticity of eﬀort substitution), andwe show that common intuition (e.g., that
corporate companies are more eﬃcient and therefore will be larger than equal-share
partnerships) might not hold in general.
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1 Introduction
Many human activities beneﬁt from collaboration. For instance, writing papers in Eco-
nomics with a coauthor is often much more eﬃcient and fun than writing them solo. But
it is very infrequent that an activity beneﬁts from the universal participation of the whole
human population—a moderate ﬁnite group suﬃces for almost every purpose. So what
determines the size of the productive company? When do the gains from cooperation
balance out the costs of overcrowding? Williamson (1971) notes:
The properties of the ﬁrm that commend internal organization as a market
substitute would appear to fall into three categories: incentives, controls, and
what may be referred to broadly as “inherent structural advantages.”
We concentrate on the inherent structural advantages of groups of diﬀerent sizes. We
study a model of collaborative production that demonstrates that the answer critically de-
pends on the properties of the production function in a very speciﬁcway. Ourmain contri-
bution is to summarize a generic but hard-to-use effort aggregation function that maps the
agents’ individual eﬀorts to the aggregated eﬀort spent on productionwith a simpler team-
work efficiency function that measures the comparative eﬃciency of a team of N workers
against one worker. We demonstrate that many tradeoﬀs arising from employing diﬀer-
ent managerial criteria can be characterized by the interplay of the production function,
which transforms aggregated eﬀort into output, and the teamwork eﬃciency function. For
instance, to determine what company size maximizes the eﬀort chosen by the company’s
employees, one needs to study the balance between the returns to teamwork eﬃciency and
the behavior of the marginal productivity of the total eﬀort.
We compare the predictions for two types of companies:
team: workers determine their eﬀort independently, and the product is split evenly; and
firm: the residual proﬁt claimant sets the eﬀort level with the optimal contract.
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We attempt to make as few assumptions about the shape of production functions as pos-
sible, which makes us give up the chance to obtain closed-form solutions. However, we
are able to obtain comparative static results regarding the change in the optimal size of the
ﬁrm due to changes in marginal costs of eﬀort, ownership structure (going from aworker-
owned to capitalist-owned ﬁrm and back), and managerial criteria (maximizing individ-
ual eﬀort versus maximizing surplus per worker). We demonstrate that the diﬀerence in
the sizes chosen by diﬀerent owners under diﬀerent managerial criteria are governed by
the direction of change in the elasticity of the production function, and therefore results
obtained under the assumption of constant elasticities are misleading. The premise that
elasticities are constant is natural in parametric estimation, but, as we show, assuming
constant elasticities rules out economically signiﬁcant behavior.
We assume away monitoring, transaction and management costs, direct and indirect,
to guarantee that they do not drive our results. We believe they are an important part
of the reason why ﬁrms exist, but they are complementary to the forces we discuss, and
their eﬀects have been extensively studied. Our point is that even in the absence of these
costs, there still might be a reason for cooperation—and a reason to limit cooperation. Ig-
noring most issues about incentives and controls allows us to obtain strong predictions,
providing an opportunity to test for the comparative importance of incentives in organiza-
tions empirically1. Our framework allows one to make judgements about the direction of
change in the company’s size due to changes in the institutional organization based upon
the values of elasticities of certain functions, which can be recovered from the empirical
observations.
We now review the relevant literature. In Section 2, we introduce the model and solve
for the eﬀort choice in both the team and the ﬁrm. In Section 3, we discuss how to identify
the optimal size of the company. The conclusion follows. The mathematical appendix
contains proofs and elaborates on the characterization of the teamwork eﬃciency function.
1See Bikard et al. (2013) as an example in team eﬃciency estimation. That paper also contains a vast
review of other empirical papers estimating collaboration eﬀects, i.e. in writing comic books, Broadway
musicals and research papers.
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1.1 Literature Review
The paper contributes to two strands of the literature. Themoral hazard in teams literature
was introduced by Holmstrom (1982), who showed that provision of eﬀort in teams will
be generally suboptimal due to externalities in eﬀort levels and the impossibility of moni-
toring individual eﬀorts perfectly. Legros and Matthews (1993) showed that the problem
of deviation from eﬃcient level eﬀort might be eﬀectively mitigated if sharing rules are
well-designed.2 Kandel and Lazear (1992) suggest peer pressure to mitigate the 1/N ef-
fect: the increase of the number of workers lowers the marginal payoﬀ from higher eﬀort.
When the ﬁrm gets larger, they argue, the output is divided between a larger quantity
of workers, while they bear the same individual costs. Hence, the eﬀort of each worker
should decrease as ﬁrms grow larger, and the peer pressure should compensate for that
decrease. Adams (2006) showed that the 1/N eﬀect may not occur if the eﬀorts of workers
are complementary enough. Because he uses a CES production function, the determinant
of suﬃcient complementarity is the value of the elasticity of substitution. Particulary, this
means that it’s eﬃcient to either always increase the ﬁrm size or to always decrease the
ﬁrm size. By generalizing, we in this paper obtain a nontrivial optimal company size.
This allows us to contribute to the ﬁrm size literature too. Theories of ﬁrm boundaries
are classiﬁed as technological, organizational and institutional (cf Kumar et al. (1999)). The
technological theories explain the ﬁrm size by the productive inputs and ways the valu-
able output is produced. Basically, there are ﬁve technological factors that are taken into
account in describing the ﬁrm size: market size, gains from specialization, management
control constraints, limitedworkers’ skills, loss of coordination. For example, AdamSmith
explained the ﬁrm size by beneﬁts from specialization limited by the market size. By his
logic, workers can specialize and invest in a narrower range of skills, hence economizing
on the costs of skills. Becker and Murphy (1992) focus on the tradeoﬀ between specializa-
2Winter (2004) argues that, frequently, the uniform split of surplus is not necessarily a good outcome.
We keep treating workers equally for analytical tractability.
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tion and coordination costs. The larger the ﬁrm, the larger the costs of management to put
them together to produce the valuable output.
Williamson (1971), Calvo and Wellisz (1978) and Rosen (1982) use loss of control for
explaining the ﬁrm size. Williamson points out that the size of a hierarchical organization
may be limited by loss of control, assuming the intentions of managers are not fully trans-
mitted downwards from layer to layer. Calvo andWellisz (1978) show that the eﬀect of the
problem is largely dependent on the structure of monitoring. If the workers do not know
when the monitoring occurs, the loss of control doesn’t hinder the ﬁrm size, while it may
if the monitoring is scheduled. Rosen (1982) highlights the tradeoﬀ between increasing
returns to scale in management and the loss of control. As highly qualiﬁed managers fos-
ter the productivity of their workers, able managers should have larger ﬁrms. However,
the attention of managers is limited, hence having toomanyworkers results in loss of con-
trol and decreases the productivity of their team substantially. The optimal ﬁrm size in
this model is when the value produced by the new worker is less than the losses due to
attention diverted from his teammates.
In this literature, Kremer (1993) is the paper closest to ours, because this is one paper
that obtains the optimal size of the ﬁrm based solely on the ﬁrm’s production function.
This paper focuses on the tradeoﬀ between specialization and probability of failure as-
sociated with low skill of workers. He assumes that the the value of output is directly
proportional to the number of tasks needed to produce it. A larger number of workers—
and hence tasks tackled—allows for the production of more valuable output, but each
additional worker is a source of risk of spoiling the whole product. Hence, the size of the
ﬁrm is explained by the probability of failure by the workers, which correlates with the
worker’s skill.
Acemoglu and Jensen (2013) analyze a problem similar to ours. In this paper, agents
pariticipate in an aggregative game, where the payoﬀ of each agent is a function only of the
agent himself and of the aggregate of the actions of all agents, and they establish existence
and comparative statics results for this type of games; Nti (1997) does a similar analysis
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for contests. In our game, we allow general interactions, but under certain assumptions
we can summarize these interactions in a similar way, which does not depend on additive
separability. Also, Acemoglu and Jensen (2013) and Nti (1997) study comparative statics
for this general class of games with respect to the number of players, whereas we go a
step beyond, looking at the optimal number of players from the perspectives of diﬀerent
managerial objectives. Jensen (2010) establishes the existence of pure strategy Nash equi-
librium in aggregative games but does not explore the symmetry of the equilibrium or the
comparative statics.
2 The Model
In this part, we will introduce the model of endogenous eﬀort choice by the company
workers as a reaction to the size of the company. Wewill deﬁne the equilibrium, determine
how the amount of eﬀort responds to the change in the company sizeN , and obtain some
comparative statics results.
Company workers contribute eﬀort for production. Eﬀorts {e1, ..., eN} are transformed
into aggregated effort by the effort aggregator function:
g(e1, ..., eN |N), (1)
where g(·|N) changes with N . The aggregated eﬀort is then used for production via f(·),
the production function3. Exercising eﬀort lowers the utility of a teammember by the eﬀort
cost c(e). Obviously, the choice of eﬀort depends upon other members’ eﬀort choice.
3This does not have to be a production function. If, for instance, g(·) delivers the amount of eﬀort spent,
q(g) delivers the quantity produced from employing g eﬀorts, and P (q) is the inverse demand function,
f(g) ≡ q(g)P (q(g))would be the revenue function, which does not have to be concave. We omit this discus-
sion for brevity, and keep calling f(·) the production function.
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The teammembers split the fruits of their eﬀorts equally. The worker’s problem in the
team is therefore to choose eﬀort e to maximize
u(e|e2, ..., eN , N) =
1
N
f (g(e, e2, ..., eN |N))− c(e). (2)
The firm of size N , in line with the literature, acknowledges the strategic complemen-
tarities betweenworkers’ eﬀorts, and provides eachworker with a contract that makes this
worker implement the ﬁrst best eﬀort level. We assume that the residual claimant collects
all the surplus; results do not change if the residual claimant only collects a ﬁxed propor-
tion of the surplus, with the rest of the surplus going to the government, to employees
as a ﬁxed transfer, or to pestilence. Workers face the same eﬀort aggregator function and
production function.
We introduce a number of assumptions in order to obtain useful characterizations.
Assumption 1. f(·) is strictly increasing and continuously differentiable degree 2.
This is a technical assumption on the production function. We do not require for now
that f(·) have decreasing returns to scale.
Assumption 2. g(·|N) is symmetric in ei, twice continuously differentiable, strictly increas-
ing in each argument, concave in one’s own effort, and homogenous4 of degree 1 with respect to
{e1, ..., eN}. Normalize g(1|1) to 1.
This assumption states that the identities of workers do not matter, only the amount
of eﬀort does. We will be using this assumption extensively, since we will be considering
symmetric equilibria.
4Homogeneity of degree of exactly 1 is not a very restrictive assumption: if one has g(·) which is homo-
thetic of degree γ, one can use g˜(·) = g(·)1/γ and f˜(x) = f(xγ). They produce the same composition, but
g˜(·) is homogenous degree 1.
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One of the consequences of this assumption is that g′1(e1, e2, .., eN |N) is homogenous
degree 0. This, in turn, implies that in a symmetric outcome
g′′11(e, e, .., e|N) + g
′′
11(e, e, .., e|N) + ...+ g
′′
1N(e, e, .., e|N) = 0⇔
g′′11(e, e, .., e|N) = −(N − 1)g
′′
1i(e, e, .., e|N) ∀i ∈ {2..N}, (3)
which by concavity in one’s own eﬀort means that in symmetric outcomes, not necessarily
everywhere, eﬀorts of members are strategic complements.
Assumption 3. c(·) is increasing, convex, twice differentiable, c(0) = c′(0) = 0.
This immediately implies that every team member exerts a positive amount of eﬀort,
since f(g(·)) is assumed to be strictly increasing at zero.
Example 1. (based on Adams, 2006) Let g(e1, .., eN |N) =
(∑N
i=1 e
ρ
i
)1/ρ
, f(x) = xα, c(x) is
increasing, twice differentiable and concave, and c′(e)e1−α is increasing5. Therefore, agent 1 solves
max
e1
1
N
(
N∑
i=1
eρi
)α/ρ
− c(e1),
which, assuming a symmetric outcome, produces e1 = ...eN = e
∗(N) = z(N
α−2ρ
ρ ), where z(x) is
the inverse of c′(x)x1−α/α, an increasing function. Hence, e∗(N) is increasing in N if and only if
ρ ∈ (0, α/2), and this implies that the effort aggregator needs to be closer to Cobb-Douglas case to
have effort increasing in the team size.
Even for a well-behaved aggregation function like CES it is hard to obtain a well-
deﬁned argmaxNe
∗(N), and this is even harder for other maximands, like the utility of
a representative agent. This goes against the data: most companies operate with a limited
workforce, whatever is the maximand they pursue. In order to understand better what
kind of function can deliver nontrivial predictions (neither 1 nor +∞), we need to charac-
5Particularly, α ≤ 1 suﬃces.
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terize the changes in e∗(N). The ﬁrst-order condition of the worker’s problem is
f ′(g(e1, ..., eN)|N))g
′
1(e1, ..., eN |N)/N − c
′(e1) = 0. (4)
Solving the ﬁrst-order condition is suﬃcient to solve for the maximum when
f ′′(g(e1, ..., eN)|N))(g
′
1(e1, ..., eN |N))
2/N+f ′(g(e1, ..., eN)|N))g
′′
1(e1, ..., eN |N)/N−c
′′(e1) < 0
(5)
for every {e2, ..., eN}. Denote εq(x) = q′(x)x/q(x), the elasticity of q(·) with respect to x.
By dividing the second-order condition by the ﬁrst-order condition andmultiplying by e1,
with a slight abuse of notation one can obtain
εf ′(g(e1, ..., eN |N))εg(e1, ..., eN |N) +
<0︷ ︸︸ ︷
εg′1(e1, ..., eN |N)−εc′(e1) < 0, (6)
which will hold whenever (5) holds.
Assumption 4. (5) holds for every {e1, ..., eN} for every N .
This holds when f(·) features decreasing returns to scale, and the aggregator function
g(·) is concave in each argument. Alternatively, one can require that c(·) is convex enough.
2.1 Effort Choice in a Team: Equilibrium Outcome
The equilibrium is a collection of eﬀorts of agents {e∗1, ..e
∗
N} such that each worker i solves
his problem (2) subject to treating eﬀorts of other peers as given:
e∗i = argmaxe
1
N
f
(
g(e, e∗−i|N)
)
− c(e),
where e∗−i denotes values of {e
∗
1, .., e
∗
N} omitting the value of e
∗
i .
Assumption 5. A unique symmetric equilibrium with nonzero efforts exists.6
6We can obtain this assumption as a result by imposing additional assumptions on f(·) and g(·), like
supermodularity and Inada conditions. The pure strategy equilibrium exists because the game we consider
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Let e∗(N) be the function that solves
f ′(g(e∗(N), .., e∗(N)|N))g′1(e
∗(N), .., e∗(N)|N)/N = c′(e∗(N)). (7)
Homogeneity of degree 1 for g(·) helps us to study the behavior of e∗(N). Deﬁne
h(N) ≡ g(1, .., 1|N).
This function represents the eﬃciency of coworking. Observe that
h(N) =
eg(
N times︷ ︸︸ ︷
1, 1, 1, .., 1 |N)
eg(1|1)
=
g(
N times︷ ︸︸ ︷
e, e, e, .., e |N)
g(e|1)
;
that is, h(N)measures howmuchmore eﬃcient is the team of agents compared to a single
person, holding eﬀort level unchanged. Henceforth we will call it the teamwork efficiency
function. For instance, if it is linear, theworking team is as eﬃcient as itsmembers applying
the same eﬀort separately. By Euler’s rule and symmetry of g(·),
h(N) = (h(N)e)′e = (g(e, e, .., e|N))
′
e = g
′
1(e, .., e)+g
′
2(e, .., e)+..+g
′
N(e, .., e) = Ng1(e, .., , e|N).
Therefore, (7) can be rewritten as
f ′(e∗(N)h(N))h(N)/N2 = c′(e∗(N)). (8)
The equation (8) is the incentive constraint that deﬁnes e∗(N) as a function of N .
here is a potential game; see Monderer and Shapley (1996), Dubey et al. (2006) and Jensen (2010). To secure
the existence and uniqueness of the symmetric outcome, one needs additional assumptions on f ◦ g(·), c(·),
direct (concavity) or indirect (proﬁt single-crossing, compactness of strategy space), but such outcomes are
clearly quite common. We opt to avoid the discussion of restrictiveness of these additional assumptions,
and concentrate on the interesting case.
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2.2 Effort Choice in a Firm: First Best
Following Holmstrom (1982), we assume that the residual claimant provides the employ-
ees with contracts that implement the ﬁrst-best choice of eﬀort.
Assumption 6. The first-best choice of effort is positive and symmetric.
The residual claimant would choose the eﬀort size eP (N) to implement by maximizing
max
e1,..eN
f(g(e1, e2, .., eN |N))−
N∑
i=1
c(ei),
which, assuming a symmetric outcome, leads to the ﬁrst-order condition
f ′(eP (N)h(N))h(N)/N = c′(eP (N)). (9)
The solution of (9), eP (N), is larger than the solution of (8), e∗(N). The reason is that
in equilibrium, the marginal payoﬀ to the individual eﬀort does not take into account the
complementarities provided to other workers. Even if the product f(·) were not split N
ways, but instead were non-rivalrous,7 the additional 1/N in the marginal beneﬁt of the
team worker would persist.
2.3 Second-Order Conditions and Uniqueness
Equation (6), the second-order condition of (8), in the symmetric equilibriumcan be rewrit-
ten as
εf ′(e
∗(N)h(N))
1
N
+
<0 because (3)︷ ︸︸ ︷
εg′1(e
∗(N), .., e∗(N)|N)−εc′(e
∗(N)) < 0. (10)
This is because εg(e∗(N), .., e∗(N)|N) =
(h(N)/N)e∗(N)
e∗(N)h(N)
= 1
N
. Let
εf ′(e
∗(N)h(N))− εc′(e
∗(N)) < 0 (11)
7For non-rivalrous goods, consumption by one agent does not prevent or worsen the consumption of
the same unit of good by another agent. Think of coauthoring a paper: the fact of eventual publication
contributes to both authors in a similar amount as if there was only one author, at least in the opinion of
some promotion committees.
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hold; then (10) is satisﬁed automatically. If c(x) ismore convex than f(y) at every x ≥ y, this
condition is satisﬁed. Similar math is used to compare the risk-aversity of individuals: for
every u(x), εu′(x) is just the negative of Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion.
The second-order condition for (9) is
f ′′(eP (N)h(N))h2(N)/N − c′′(eP (N)) < 0,
which, after dividing by the ﬁrst-order condition, can be rewritten as
εf ′(e
P (N)h(N))− εc′(e
P (N)) < 0. (12)
Observe that it is very similar to (11): the eﬀort level in the argument is diﬀerent.
Result 1. If εf ′(x) is weakly decreasing, εf ′(x) < εc′(x), and h(N) ≥ 1, (11) and (12) are satisfied.
Second-order conditions hold at maxima automatically, but if they hold everywhere,
the solution of the corresponding FOC has to be unique. Result 1 thus provides suﬃcient
conditions for the uniqueness of the pure strategy outcome.
εf ′(x) being decreasing has the following interpretation. When εf ′(x) is constant and
equal to α, it means that f ′(x) = Kxα + C, which makes f(x) a power function unless
α = −1, in which case f ′(x) = K ln x + C, where K and C are integration constants. The
decreasing εf ′(x) implies “lower power”, or ”less convexity” of f(·) at larger arguments.
3 The Optimal Size of the Company
Algebraically, the problem of the optimal ﬁrm size with distinct nonatomary agents lies in
the discreteness of the ﬁrm size. However, using homogeneity and the function h(N), we
alleviated this mathematical problem. With diﬀerentiable h(N), we can take derivatives
with respect to N , and expect e∗(N) and eP (N) deﬁned with (8) and (9) to be continuous
and diﬀerentiable.
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In order to conduct the comparative statics with respect to N , we will apply the usual
implicit function apparatus. For now, h(N) has only been deﬁned for N ∈ {1, 2, 3, ...}.
With a heroic leap of faith, we extend the deﬁnition of h(N) to real positive semi-axis.8
We postpone the discussion of how to choose a continuous h(N) if one only wields g(·) to
Appendix A.1.
Knowing how the workers of the company of size N choose their eﬀort, we can char-
acterize the consequences of various company managerial objectives on its hiring policy.
Assumption 7. The Problems we study are single-peaked, that is, there is a unique interior
maximum point, and the derivative of every Problem’s Lagrangean is strictly positive below that
point, and strictly negative above that point.
The omitted caveats (multiple local maxima, etc) do not improve the understanding.
3.1 Team Size That Maximizes Effort
In this subsection, we will introduce the apparatus we use to make statements about the
optimal size of the company. This subsection is crucial to understanding the further anal-
ysis. We therefore keep the analysis in this part very explicit. Other problemswill be dealt
with in a similar fashion, therefore we relocate the repetitive parts to the Appendix.
From (8) one can deduce e∗(N), well-deﬁned over N ∈ R+, continuous and diﬀeren-
tiable.
Problem 1. Characterize N1 = argmaxN e
∗(N).
Take elasticities with respect to N on both sides of (8) to get:
εf ′(e
∗(N)h(N)) [εe∗(N) + εh(N)] + εh(N)− 2 = εc′(e
∗(N))εe∗(N).
8For g(e1, e2, ..eN |N) =
√
e21 + ..+ e
2
N + α
∑
i 6=j eiej , α ∈ [0,+∞) yields h(N) =
√
αN2 + (1− α)N ,
with εh(N) = 1 − 1−α2αN+(1−α) , an increasing function of N when α < 1 and a decreasing function when
α > 1. Many papers impose an ad hoc g(·); Kremer (1993) argues for Cobb-Douglas, Rajan and Zingales
(1998) goes for linear additive; see Dubey et al. (2006), p. 86 and Jensen (2010), p. 16 for other examples.
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εh(N)
εf ′(e
∗(N)h(N))
Φ1
e∗(N)ր
e∗(N)ց
N = 1
N = 2
N = 3
N = 4
(a) In (εh, εf ′) space
εh(N)
εf ′(e
∗(N)h(N))
Φ1
e∗(N)ր
e∗(N)ց
N = 1
N = 2
N = 3
N = 4
(b) Result 2 logic
Figure 1: The choice of N to maximize eﬀort in a team; and the Result 2 logic
Solve this to obtain
εe∗(N) =
εh(N) (εf ′(e
∗(N)h(N)) + 1)− 2
εc′(e∗(N))− εf ′(e∗(N)h(N))
. (13)
From (13) one can immediately see that the N that maximizes e∗(N) has to satisfy
εh(N) (εf ′(e
∗(N)h(N)) + 1) = 2. (14)
The denominator of (13) is positive: it is a second-order condition of the eﬀort choice
problem, (11). Therefore, whenever εh(N) (εf ′(e∗(N)h(N)) + 1) > 2, e∗(N) is increasing in
N , and otherwise it is decreasing in N .
In the space of (x, y) = (εh(·), εf (·)), Equation (14) simpliﬁesto:
Φ1 = {(x, y)|x (y + 1) = 2.}
Solving out the equilibrium will produce a function e∗(N), and therefore a sequence of
values of (εh(N), εf ′(e∗(N)h(N)). We depict an example of this path on Figure 1. Denote
Γ1 = ((εh(N), εf ′(e
∗(N)h(N)))|Equation (8) holds).
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For the sequence depicted on the Figure 1, one can observe that e∗(N) is increasing at
N ≤ 3, and decreasing forN ≥ 4. Therefore, the optimal “continuous”N (denote itN1) is
between 3 and 4, and the integer N that delivers the maximum eﬀort is either 3 or 4.
The assumption that g(·) is CES makes εh(N) constant; the assumption that f ′(·) is a
power function makes εf ′(·) constant. Example 1 predicts that whether e∗(N) is increas-
ing or decreasing everywhere depends upon the elasticity of substitution of g(·) precisely
because, in the world of Example 1, f(x) = x and g(·) is CES. Γ1 is a single point in these
assumptions. Therefore, in order to have a nontrivial prediction about the optimal eﬀort
size, one needs either a decreasing εh(N), or a decreasing ε′f (·), or both. Obtaining values
in the general case in inherently complicated, but one, however, can make comparative
statics predictions without knowing the precise speciﬁcation of relevant functions.
Result 2. When εf ′ is decreasing, an increase (decrease) in the marginal costs of effort leads to an
increase (decrease) in N1. When εf ′ is increasing, an increase (decrease) in the marginal costs of
effort leads to a decrease (increase) in N1.
Even without knowing the precise values of elasticities, one can obtain useful results.
Assumptions like concavity of f can restrict the economically important behavior:
Example 2. (based on Rajan and Zingales, 1998, Lemma 2, p. 398) Let g(e1, ..eN |N) =
∑N
i=1 ei,
and let f(x) be concave. Then
εf ′(x) =
f ′′(x)x
f ′(x)
< 0, h(N) = N ⇒ εh(N) = 1,
and therefore, for every N , (εh(N), εf ′(e
∗(N)h(N))) < (1, 1), no matter what c(·) is. The indi-
vidual effort decreases with N for every N .
Our results extend to the case when intersections are multiple in a manner similar to
the way that comparative statics with multiple equilibria are treated. We will concentrate
on the single-crossing case for brevity.
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3.2 Firm Size That Maximizes Effort
We will assume that when the ﬁrm designs a contract, it tries to implement the ﬁrst-best,
which takes into account the agents’ complementarities in g(·). If a social planner were
choosing the eﬀort for the agents, his FOC would suggest a higher eﬀort for a given N
(see the discussion of the 1/N eﬀect on p. 11). Since c′(·) is increasing, this immediately
implies that eP (N) ≥ e∗(N), with equality at N = 1, and therefore the eﬀort-maximizing
sizes of a ﬁrm and a team do not have to coincide.
Problem 2. Characterize N2 = argmaxN e
P (N).
The ﬁrst-order condition9 becomes
εh(N)
(
εf ′(e
P (N)h(N)) + 1
)
= 1. (15)
Again, if the left-hand side is larger than the right-hand side, the eﬀort is increasing in
N , and the reverse holds when the left-hand side is smaller than 1. The change of the
managerial objective aﬀects multiple components of the optimal size problem:
• The threshold that governs when the ﬁrm is big enough, Φ1, is now replaced by
Ψ1 = {(x, y)|x (y + 1) = 1}.
The reason why 2 in the deﬁnition of Φ1 is replaced with 1 in the deﬁnition of Ψ1 is
exactly because the marginal 1/N eﬀect, that appeared because individual marginal
beneﬁt did not include the beneﬁts provided to the other participants, went away.
• Since eP (N) > e∗(N) for almost every level of N , the values of ε′f (e
P (N)h(N)) 6=
ε′f (e
∗(N)h(N)), unless f(·) is a power function in the relevant domain.
Figure 2a demonstrates the diﬀerence, assuming that ε′f (·) is a decreasing function.
Since h(N) did not change, abscissae are the same for diﬀerent values of N for both Φ1
9See Appendix for derivation of solutions for Problems 2-5.
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εh(N)
εf ′(e
P (N)h(N))
Φ1Ψ1
(eP (N))′ > 0
(eP (N))′ < 0
N = 1
N = 2
N = 3
N = 4N = 5
(a) If e∗(N) were equal to eP (N)
εh(N)
εf ′(e
P (N)h(N))
Φ1Ψ1
(eP (N))′ > 0
(eP (N))′ < 0
N = 1
N = 2
N = 3
N = 4
N = 5
N = 1
N = 2
N = 3
N = 4N = 5
(b) e∗(N) < eP (N), and εf ′(x) is increasing near
N1
Figure 2: Choosing N to maximize eﬀort, the ﬁrm case
and Ψ1. One can see that two eﬀects are at odds: since the threshold is further away,
larger ﬁrms become more eﬃcient. However, the change in εf ′(·) due to higher eﬀorts for
each ﬁrm size might lower the optimal ﬁrm size.
Result 3. If εf ′(x) is weakly increasing, firms that maximize employees’ effort will be larger than
teams that choose their team size to maximize the efforts of the members.
Proof. See Appendix.
3.3 Team Size That Maximizes Utility
Does it make sense to invite more members to join the team? If this increases the utility
of other team members, absolutely. Therefore, the team size that maximizes the utility of
a member of the team is the team size that would emerge if teams were free to invite or
expel members.
Problem 3. Characterize N3 = argmaxN
1
N
f(h(N)e∗(N))− c(e∗(N)).
N3 should solve the following ﬁrst-order condition:
εf (e
∗(N)h(N))
(
εh(N) +
N − 1
N
εe∗(N)
)
= 1. (16)
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εh(N)
εf ′(e
∗(N)h(N))
Φ1
Φ2
ε¯h
N = 1
N = 2
N = 3
N = 4
N = 5
Note: Below both graphs both eﬀorts and proﬁts increase as the size of the ﬁrm goes larger. Above both graphs both eﬀorts and proﬁts decrease withN . Between graphs, when
εh(N) < ε¯h , eﬀorts increase withN , but proﬁts decrease; the reverse holds when εh(N) > ε¯h .
Figure 3: Choosing N to maximize individual utility
Again, at values of N where the left-hand side is larger (smaller) than 1, the utility is
increasing (decreasing) inN . Let Φ2 be the set of locations where (16) holds with equality.
This line, evaluated at N = N1, is plotted over Γ1 and Φ1 on Figure 3.
One can immediately see that:
• There is a unique intersection of Φ1 and Φ2, and it happens at ε¯h = 1/εf (e(N1)h(N1)).
• The path of Γ1 intersects Φ1 above Φ1
⋂
Φ2 if and only if N1 < N3. In general, when
two diﬀerent maximands are used, diﬀerent answers are to be expected, but our
result makes issues clearer: the only thing necessary to establish whether N1 < N3
is the value of εh(N1) and εf (e∗(N1)h∗(N1)).
Result 4. If εf (x) is increasing (decreasing), εf ′(x) + 1 > (<) εf (x), and therefore N3 is larger
(smaller) than N1.
Therefore, if the elasticity of f(·) at the size of the team chosen by team members N3
is too small, it is likely that the team will be too large to implement high eﬀorts (N3 >
N1). For instance, in teaching, many lecturers assign home assignments for group work.
Some lecturers use ﬁxed group sizes, other lecturers allow students to form groups of
their choosing. If higher eﬀort is desirable (for instance, because eﬀort in the classroom
is valuable on the labor market, which is not fully understood by students), it might be a
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good idea to restrict the group size, against the complaints of students. If the elasticity of
f(·) atN1 is larger than εf ′(·)+1 at the sameN1, students will yearn for increase of the size
of the group, and they will complain that the required group size is too large otherwise.
3.4 Firm Size That Maximizes Utility
This could be a problem for an employee-owned ﬁrm, where the residual claimant collects
zero proﬁt and is only necessary to punish deviators for violations of the optimal contract.
Problem 4. Characterize N4 = argmaxN
1
N
f(h(N)eP (N))− c(eP (N)).
At N4, the following holds (see Appendix for derivation):
εf (e
P (N)h(N))εh(N) = 1 (17)
When εf (eP (N)h(N))εh(N) > 1, the utility of each member of the ﬁrm is increasing with
the size of the ﬁrm, and the utility is decreasing otherwise.
One can see the diﬀerence of (15) and (17): they have to be equal only when ∀x, εf (x) =
εf ′(x) + 1, which implies that f(x) is the power function.
Result 5. If εf (x) is increasing (decreasing), εf ′(x) + 1 > (<) εf (x), and therefore N4 is larger
(smaller) than N2.
Proof. See Appendix.
This Result helps to establish why people do not work eﬃciently in diﬀerent environ-
ments. The problem is not so much in the returns to scale of the production function, the
relevant threshold is the comparison of the ﬁrst and second derivativeÑŃ of the produc-
tion functionÐś which boils down to whether the elasticity of the production function is
locally increasing or decreasing. Those employee-owned companies, whose employees
feel that they would be more motivated and would work harder had they had more col-
laborators, have εf (eP (N)h(N)) < εf ′(eP (N)h(N))+1, their production function is locally
more concave than the power function.
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Results for other managerial objectives can be obtained in a similar fashion: for in-
stance, a residual claimant that collects a ﬁxed proportion of the total surplus of the ﬁrm
will employ more than N4 workers as long as (12) holds. We reserve these for the future
research.
3.5 The Quagmire Of Constant Elasticities
The previous analysis showed that at least one of two elasticities cannot be constant in
order to obtain a well-deﬁned optimal company size. However, even holding one of two
elasticities constant can mislead. In the following example, we assume that εh(N) is de-
creasing from a large enough value to 0, whereas the production function is a power func-
tion.
Example 3. Let f(x) = xα and c(e) = eβ . Let β > α > 0, then relevant Assumptions and (11)
are satisfied. For general but convenient h(·), where εh(·) is decreasing, the first-best e
P (N) chosen
by the firm satisfies
α(eP (N)h(N))α−1
h(N)
N
= β(eP (N))β−1 ⇒
eP (N) = exp
[
lnα− ln β
β − α
+
α
β − α
lnh(N)−
1
β − α
lnN
]
.
The effort size e∗(N) chosen by the members of the team satisfies
α(e∗(N)h(N))α−1
h(N)
N2
= β(e∗(N))β−1 ⇒
e∗(N) = exp
[
lnα− ln β
β − α
+
α
β − α
lnh(N)−
2
β − α
lnN
]
.
Let us order firm sizes chosen with different managerial objectives. When εh(N) is decreasing,
1. N1, the team size that maximizes the effort when the effort level is chosen simultaneously and
independently, satisfies εh(N1) = 2/α;
2. N2, the firm size that maximizes the effort when the effort level is chosen according to the first
best, satisfies εh(N2) = 1/α;
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Nεh(N)
εh(N)
2/α
1/α
2/β
1/β
N1 N2 N3
2(N−1)
Nβ−α
(a) When β > 2α
N
εh(N)
εh(N)
2/α
1/α
2/β
1/β
2(N−1)
Nβ−α
N1 N2N3
(b) When β < 2α
Note: N2 = N4 in both cases because f(·) is a power function.
Figure 4: Ordering solutions from Example 3
3. N3, the team size that maximizes the team member’s utility when the effort level is chosen si-
multaneously and independently, solves εh(N) =
2(N−1)
Nβ−α
, right-hand size of which is mono-
tone, and converges to 2/β from below.
4. N4, the firm size that maximizes the utility per worker
10 when the effort level is chosen ac-
cording to the first best, satisfies εh(N4) = 1/α;
Example 3 supplies the following intuition for diﬀerent maximands (see Figure 4):
1 & 2 Eﬀort-maximizing size of the ﬁrm is larger than the eﬀort-maximizing size of the
team. This is a consequence of f(·) being a power function (see Result 3), and does
not have to hold in general.
1 & 3 The company size chosen by the team when the eﬀort level is chosen individually
is smaller than the company size chosen to maximize the eﬀort size. This is not
a general result, but a consequence of a strong connection between εf (·) = α and
εf ′(·) = α − 1. Compare (14) and (16): when N is such that (8) is satisﬁed, (16)
suggests that the utility of each participant would go up if the size of the team went
down.
10This coincides with revenue per worker if the ﬁrst best contract provides 0 utility to the worker.
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2 & 4 The size of the ﬁrm that maximizes employees’ utilities is maximizing their eﬀort as
well. This is not a general result, but a direct consequence of f(x) = xα: conditions
(15) and (17) coincide algebraically.
3 & 4 When a self-organized teambecomes incorporated, itmight become larger or smaller.
If 2α < β, then the incorporated ﬁrm becomes smaller than the team. Otherwise,
the ﬁrm can become larger, but only when N3 > 1/(2− β/α).
This exercise demonstrates many spurious ﬁndings arising simply from the desire of
closed form solutions. Some of the strong predictions are generalizable, but most are a
consequence of the power function assumptions.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we stepped away from the common assumptions about production functions
to study the eﬀects of scale on the optimal size of a company frommany perspectives. Our
contribution is to circumvent the inherent discontinuity in hiringwhen complementarities
are important. We found ways to characterize the eﬀects of changes in the management
of the company, like incorporation of a partnership, or going from private to public, on
hiring or ﬁring, and whether employers’s eﬀort will suﬀer from overcrowding or from
insuﬃcient specialization. We found that teams do not have to be larger or smaller than
ﬁrms that use the same production function. The analytic framework we suggest is very
general, and can be modiﬁed to include uncertainty, non-trivial ﬁrm ownership (for in-
stance, one worker can be the claimant to the residual proﬁt, with nontrivial implications
on the eﬀort choice), non-trivial wage schedules (for instance, imperfect observability of
eﬀort, total or individual, can call for the design of the optimal wage schedule), or proﬁt-
splitting schemes from cooperative game theory like the Shapley value.
The homogeneity of workers is important in our analysis. We have obtained results
for heterogenous workforce, where some workers are capable (can choose a positive eﬀort
value), and incapable (those who can only choose zero eﬀort). We can show that it might
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be the case that the incapableworkers are employed alongwith capable ones: this happens
if the eﬀort aggregation function is such that the employment of an extra person provides
teamwork eﬃciency externalities for the capable workers, whereas additional eﬀort from
the hired capable person would diminish the productivity of other capable employees.
A Mathematical Appendix
Solution of Problem 1 in text, on page 13.
Solution of Problem 2 To choose the ﬁrm size that maximizes the level of eﬀort, take the
derivative of both sides of
f ′(eP (N)h(N))h(N)/N = c′(eP (N))
with respect to N . The values of N where (eP (N))′ = 0will be the one we are looking for.
The derivative looks like
f ′′(eP (N)h(N))[h(N)(eP (N))′+h′(N)eP (N)]h(N)/N+f ′(eP (N)h(N))[h′(N)/N−h(N)/N2] =
= c′′(eP (N))(eP (N))′.
Divide by the ﬁrst-order condition to obtain
f ′′(eP (N)h(N))[h(N)(eP (N))′ + h′(N)eP (N)]h(N)/N + f ′(eP (N)h(N))[h′(N)/N − h(N)/N2]
f ′(eP (N)h(N))h(N)/N
=
=
c′′(eP (N))(eP (N))′
c′(eP (N))
.
Rearrange to obtain
[
c′′(eP (N))eP (N)
c′(eP (N))
−
f ′′(eP (N)h(N))h(N)eP (N)
f ′(eP (N)h(N))
]
(eP (N))′N
eP (N)
=
h′(N)N
h(N)
[
1 +
f ′′(eP (N)h(N))
f ′(eP (N)h(N))
]
−1.
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Rewrite:
εeP (N) =
εh(N)
(
εf ′(e
P (N)h(N)) + 1
)
− 1
εc′(eP (N))− εf ′(eP (N)h(N))
.
When εh(N)
(
εf ′(e
P (N)h(N)) + 1
)
> 1, eﬀort increases with the size of team, and eﬀort
decreases otherwise.
Solution of Problem 3 To choose the team size that maximizes utility, solve
max
N
1
N
f (h(N)e∗(N))− c(e∗(N)),
where e∗(N) is such that (8) holds. The ﬁrst-order condition is:
f ′(e∗(N)h(N)) (e∗(N)h′(N) + (e∗(N))′h(N)) /N−f(e∗(N)h(N))/N2−c′(e∗(N))(e∗(N))′ <> 0,
with a> sign when the utility of each teammember is increasing in the membership size,
with a <when the utility of each member is decreasing in the membership size, and with
equality at optimum. Substitute (8):
f ′(e∗(N)h(N)) (e∗(N)h′(N) + (e∗(N))′h(N)) /N − f(e∗(N)h(N))/N2 −(
f ′(e∗(N)h(N))h(N)/N2
)
(e∗(N))′ <> 0.
Group variables and divide by f(e∗(N)h(N))/N2 > 0 to obtain
f ′(e∗(N)h(N))(e∗(N)h(N))
f(e∗(N)h(N))
(
e∗(N)h′(N)N + (e∗(N))′h(N)(N − 1)
(e∗(N)h(N))
)
− 1 <> 0,
εf (e
∗(N)h(N))
(
εh(N) +
N − 1
N
εe∗(N)
)
− 1 <> 0.
Solution of Problem 4 To maximize the utility of each member of the team when their
eﬀort is imposed to deliver the ﬁrst best outcome, the size of the ﬁrm should be chosen to
solve
max
N
f(eP (N)h(N))
1
N
− c(eP (N)),
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subject to (9). The ﬁrst-order condition of this problem is
f ′(f(eP (N)h(N)))[eP (N)h′(N)+h(N)(eP (N))′]
1
N
−
1
N2
f(eP (N)h(N))−c′(eP (N))(eP (N))′ <> 0.
Divide by f(eP (N)h(N))/N2 and rearrange to obtain
1
f(eP (N)h(N))/N2
(
εf (e
P (N)h(N))εh(N)− 1
)
<> 0. (18)
Result 1. For every level of eﬀort e,
εf ′(eh(N)) < εf ′(e) < εc′(e).
Using the eﬀort levels implied by either equilibrium outcome or ﬁrst best completes the
proof.
Lemma 1. Let e˜(N) > e(N). If εf ′(·) is weakly decreasing (increasing), the effort-maximizing
team size under e˜(N) is lower (higher) than the effort maximizing team size for e(N).
Lemma 1. LetN1 and N˜1 be solutions to team eﬀort maximizing problemswith eﬀort func-
tions e(N) and e˜(N) respectively. If εf ′(·) is weakly decreasing, since e(N) < e˜(N)
εh(N˜1)
(
εf ′(e(N˜1)h(N˜1)) + 1
)
− 2 ≥ εh(N˜1)
(
εf ′(e˜(N˜1)h(N˜1)) + 1
)
− 2 = 0.
Since we assumed that the problem is single-peaked, this implies that the eﬀort is increas-
ing with N for e(N) at N = N˜1, or that N1 > N˜1. The result for increasing εf ′(·) is proven
similarly.
Result 2. Suppose themarginal costs decrease to c˜′(x) ≤ c′(x) for any x. Consider symmet-
ric equilibrium eﬀorts e(N) for the initial problem and c(·) costs, and e˜(N) under modiﬁed
costs c˜(·). By necessary conditions e(N) and e˜(N) solve (7) with marginal cost functions
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c′(x) and c˜′(x) respectively. Therefore,
f ′(e(N)h(N))h(N)/N2 − c˜′(e(N)) ≥ 0 = f ′(e˜(N)h(N))h(N)/N2 − c˜′(e˜(N)).
This, combined with second order conditions and single crossing, implies e˜′(N) ≥ e(N).
Applying Lemma 1, we obtain the result.
Result 3. Let N˜1 solve
εh(N˜1)
(
εf ′(e
P (N˜1)h(N˜1)) + 1
)
− 2 = 0.
Then N˜1 ≤ N2 by single-peakedness assumption for Problem 1. Moreover, by Lemma 1,
N˜1 ≥ N1 as eP (N) ≥ e∗(N) for each N . Hence, N2 ≥ N˜1 ≥ N1.
Result 4. Observe that
(εf (x))
′ = (εf ′(x) + 1− εf (x))
εf (x)
x
.
Since f(·) is an increasing function, the ﬁrst part of the statement is proven. The second
part of the statement follows immediately from evaluating (16) at N1.
Result 5. εf (x) ≥ εf ′(x) + 1means
εf (e
P (N2)h(N2))εh(N)− 1 ≥ (εf ′(e
P (N2)h(N2)) + 1)εh(N)− 1 = 0
Workers’ utility increases at N2, hence by single-peakedness assumption N2 ≤ N4.
A.1 The Choice of h′(·)
If one knows f(·), h(·), and c(·), one can conduct the analysis above. However, h′(N) is
not a fundamental, at least not in non-integer values. It suﬃces to know h(N) to evaluate
e∗, eP , εf , εf ′ and εc at integerNs. The optimum characterizations, however, depend upon
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h′(N) as well. h′(N) values at integer points would suﬃce, since optimization requires
checking whether the value of the elasticity of h(·) is above or below a certain threshold.
How can one choose the value of h′(N) at integer points if one only knows h(N) at integer
points? Obviously, arbitrary choices of h′(N) can position the points all over the space of
(εh, εf ′). One can impose a reﬁnement over the possible derivatives of h(N):
h′(N) ∈ [min(h(N + 1)− h(N), h(N)− h(N − 1)),max(h(N + 1)− h(N), h(N)− h(N − 1))] .
(19)
To connect integer points, assume that between two neighboring integers, h′(N) is mono-
tone. This implies that extrema of h(N) are only at integer points. Obviously, this pre-
serves concavity, convexity and monotonicity, had h(N) deﬁned over integers had these
properties. This limitation helps a lot in characterizing the optimal paths. Consider Fig-
ure 5, which is similar to Figure 3, but instead of points along the path of Γ1, we plot sets
for every value of εf ′(e∗(N)h(N)) that is consistent with some value of h′(N) restricted by
(19) at integer values, and then imposemonotonicity for h(·) across the path to connect the
integer values. On Figure 5, one can see that the intersection with Φ1 happens between
N = 3 andN = 4, whereas forΦ2 intersection with Γ1 happens betweenN = 4 andN = 5.
Therefore, for f(·) and g(·) behind Figure 5, the self-organizing team will be too large to
maximize eﬀorts.
The reverse problem of obtaining g(·) if one knows h(·) but not g(·) is surprisingly easy.
Result 6. For every h(N),
g(e1, .., eN |N) = h(N) (e1e2...eN)
1/N
and
g(e1, .., eN |N) = h(N)/N
1/ρ
(
N∑
i=1
eρi
)1/ρ
for ρ < 1 have properties necessary to apply the analysis above.
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εh(N)
εf ′(e
∗(N)h(N))
Φ1
Φ2
ε¯h
N = 1
N = 2
N = 3
N = 4
N = 5
Note: The solid lines represent the possible values for the path Γ1 at integerNs under the restriction of (19). Shaded region represent possible places for the path of Γ1 over
non-integer values ofN . Arrows follow a sample path.
Figure 5: Applying restriction (19) to characterizeN1when continuous h(·) is not available.
Proof. It is straightforward to see that, for g(e1, ..eN) = h(N)(e1e2...eN)1/N , one obtains
g(1, 1, .., 1|N) = h(N)(1× 1× 1× ..× 1)1/N = h(N),
and homogeneity degree 1 is trivial. Since the function is Cobb-Douglas conditional on
N , g′i(·|N) =
1
N
g(·|N)
ei
> 0 and g′′ii = −
N−1
N2
g(·|N)
e2i
< 0. Therefore, Assumption 1 is satisﬁed.
The CES case is proven similarly.
This result emphasizes the comparative importance of h(N) over the complementari-
ties in g(·): many diﬀerent families of g(·) functions can supply mathematically identical
h(N) functions. g(·) should provide enough complementarity for eﬀort choice problem to
have a unique solution. The marginal eﬀects of eﬀort complementarity are less important
than scale eﬀects of teamwork for the question of the eﬃcient ﬁrm size. This, of course, is
a consequence of homogeneity of g(·).
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